THE DAILY EDITION

Cyber security

8 items · 38 articles in this topic

The day is dominated by LLM gateway scanning and AI-assisted attack tooling, alongside older bugs and industrial and supply-chain exposure. Several items have no patch yet.

  1. 1

    Midnight Blue disclosed six unpatched flaws in Danfoss AK-SM800A refrigeration controllers that allow remote takeover without login. No fix is available.

    HighThe Hacker News ↗6 min read
  2. 2

    BO Team exploited Log4Shell in VMware vCenter to compromise a Russian developer's code-signing server, per Kaspersky ICS CERT. A compromised signing server is a route to trusted malicious binaries.

    HighThe Hacker News ↗9 min read
  3. 3

    A researcher reports a universal XSS in uBlock Origin triggered through a website-driven element picker. The summary gives no versions or fix status.

    HighHacker News (front page) ↗4 min read
  4. 4

    Researchers show Windows Hello PINs can be brute-forced by abusing replay-protected monotonic counter (RPMC) rollback protection on firmware TPMs.

  5. 5

    The Tor Project shipped security release 0.4.9.17 with a rapid DoS-defense fix during a sustained DDoS attack.

    HighHacker News (front page) ↗1 min read
  6. 6

    Coles Group, Australia's second-largest retailer, is investigating a cyber security incident that has not affected its stores. No details on data or cause are given.

    NotableBleepingComputer ↗2 min read
  7. 7

    Kaspersky disclosed a new CoffeeLoader variant delivered via an NSIS installer, linked to the Retadup worm returning seven years after its takedown.

    HighThe Hacker News ↗4 min read
  8. 8

    TSMC confirmed leaked employee personal data after a threat actor auctioned 6.9GB of allegedly stolen files. The breach is linked to a cloud provider.

    NotableBleepingComputer ↗2 min read
More in Cyber security · 29 articles›
  • Attackers are scanning honeypots for CVE-2026-42271 and CVE-2026-48710 in LiteLLM/Starlette, which can chain to unauthenticated remote code execution.

    SANS Internet Storm Centercvercelitellmexploitation
    Feed excerpt

    This weekend, we started seeing requests for /mcp-rest/test/tools/list hitting our honeypots. These requests appear to attempt to exploit CVE-2026-42271 and CVE-2026-48710. Horizon3.ai published a short write-up about how these vulnerabilities can be chained to achieve remote code execution without authentication [Horizon3]

  • A previously unknown 11-year-old Linux kernel TCP flaw, NoisyTCP, lets attackers crash servers running Nginx, Apache, and SSH in default configurations.

    BleepingComputerlinuxvulnerabilitydos
    Feed excerpt

    An 11-year-old Linux kernel vulnerability, dubbed NoisyTCP, affects almost all Linux distributions and lets attackers crash systems running Nginx, Apache, and SSH servers with default configurations. [...]

  • Amazon threat intelligence found attacker AI agents scanning exposed LiteLLM, One API, and Dify apps to steal AI provider API keys.

    The Hacker Newsai-agentsapi-keyslitellmdifythreat-actor
    Feed excerpt

    Attackers' AI agents have been hunting for weak spots in internet-exposed AI apps such as LiteLLM, One API, and Dify to steal the AI provider keys stored inside, according to the agents' own records. The records, which Amazon's threat intelligence team captured with decoy servers, describe stolen keys being used to run the AI models that powered the search for more keys. The team said this

  • Australian grocer Coles disclosed a cybersecurity incident affecting its systems, according to its updates page.

    Hacker News (front page)breachretailaustralia
    Feed excerpt

    Article URL: https://www.colesgroup.com.au/updates/ Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50512824 Points: 52 # Comments: 24

  • Old Bitly links are being hijacked to redirect to malicious or unwanted destinations, including a Burger King tweet link.

    Hacker News (front page)link-hijackingbitlyphishing
    Feed excerpt

    Article URL: https://ransomnews.com/burger-king-tweet-bitly-link-hijack-2026/ Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50511395 Points: 116 # Comments: 58

  • The FBI warns that attackers are using the AI-powered pentesting framework ARTEX in global attacks, including a ConnectWise supply-chain breach affecting Microsoft 365 environments.

    BleepingComputerfbiai-attacksupply-chainmicrosoft-365
    Feed excerpt

    The FBI is warning that hackers are using an AI-powered penetration testing framework called ARTEX to automate cyberattacks against organizations worldwide, including a recent ConnectWise supply-chain breach that compromised Microsoft 365 customer environments. [...]

  • Schneier analyzes a case where attackers used a fake booking request to access a luxury hotel reservations inbox and get fraudulent refunds approved.

    Schneier on Securitysocial-engineeringfraudcase-study
    Feed excerpt

    Interesting case study from luxury hotels. Attackers used a fake booking request to gain access to a reservations inbox, where they copied genuine refund requests and got fraudulent ones approved. This is a good illustration why “just don’t click on links” is bad advice. It can’t work when answering strangers’ emails is the job. Even worse, in this case the guest-first culture punishes hesitation. More interesting, the case study shows that splitting security between owner, operator, and brand leaves nobody accountable. And this is exactly the setting where blaming staff becomes the convenient answer.

  • Threat cluster REF3364 runs SANSAR, a Rust-based Linux cryptominer controlled over Tor, which patches an NVIDIA library to hide GPU usage.

    The Hacker Newsmalwarecryptomininglinux
    Feed excerpt

    A financially motivated threat activity cluster tracked as REF3364 has been attributed to a Linux-focused cryptocurrency mining operation that tampers with the readings used to detect high GPU workloads. Central to the intrusion is a toolkit called SANSAR, a Rust-based orchestrator that receives commands over the TOR anonymity network to manage CPU and GPU miners. The activity was observed in

  • Empirical study examines whether LLMs can use weight-space programming to inject backdoors into neural networks.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)backdoorllmmodel-security
    Feed excerpt

    arXiv:2611.17395v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent advances in weight-space programming (WSP) have demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) can directly inspect and modify neural network weights without conventional gradient-based training. While this capability opens new possibilities for model improvement, it also raises an important security question: Can LLMs exploit weight-space programming to inject backdoors into neural networks? To answer this question, we present an empirical security study of LLM-driven weight-space programming for backdoor injection. Specifically, we investigate whether general-purpose LLMs can directly modify the weights of target models according to natural-language instructions, without accessing task-specific data, performing forward passes, or computing gradients. We evaluate five LLMs as weight editors across three target architectures: an MLP on MNIST, ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10, and Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct on AG News. Our experiments reveal three key findings. First, LLM-driven weight editing can successfully inject backdoors across different architectures while largely preserving clean performance. Second, successful attacks can require remar…

  • Introduces Detail Guidance Attack, a jailbreak method that makes malicious LLM requests resemble normal user queries to evade filters.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)jailbreakllmprompt-injection
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    arXiv:2611.17818v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Jailbreak attacks can circumvent the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) and lead to the generation of harmful or policy-violating content. We first examine eight jailbreak methods against an LLM-based filter and observe that requests resembling normal user queries tend to have higher filter pass rates than those containing obvious anomalous patterns. This observation motivates the hypothesis that resemblance to normal requests may contribute to jailbreak success. We introduce \textbf{Detail Guidance Attack (DGA)}, a framework that uses an auxiliary LLM to construct detailed requests and interacts with the victim model in a single turn. Across 11 victim models and three datasets, the complete DGA pipeline achieves high attack success rates under our automated judging criterion, including rates above 95\% in several evaluated settings. We also evaluate a DGA-aware filter and conduct a user study on everyday requests with ambiguous or dual-use intent. The survey documents differing expectations about whether models should respond; the usability costs of the filter remain to be measured.

  • CANTraj shows vehicle CAN bus signals like speed and steering can reconstruct driving routes even when GPS is removed from logs.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)privacyvehiclecan-busresearch
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    arXiv:2611.18442v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Open driving releases and usage-based insurance programs often claim to prevent privacy breaches by omitting GPS records when sharing or collecting vehicle data. However, removing GPS coordinates from driving logs does not erase the location information carried by vehicle signals. While prior route-inference attacks have demonstrated that speed, steering, and driving events can be matched to road networks to reconstruct trajectories, existing studies rely on inconsistent prior assumptions and evaluation metrics and are tested only on small, restricted datasets, making their results difficult to compare and their real-world effectiveness uncertain. We release CANTraj, a naturalistic driving dataset pairing decoded CAN events with time-aligned GNSS trajectories (3,940 drives, 454 drivers), and CANTraj-Bench for evaluating trajectory recovery (3,675 drives, 431 drivers, 1,380 hours, 85,919 km). On 776 evaluation drives from 94 unseen drivers, we compare six re-implemented attacks and benchmark baselines under explicit information-access protocols, paired comparisons, and metrics incorporating failures. Experiments show that combining ste…

  • Paper shows RFC 6979 deterministic ECDSA nonce derivation relies on an assumption that a counterexample breaks, leaking keys from one signature.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)cryptographyecdsasecp256k1
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    arXiv:2611.18449v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: RFC 6979 derives the ECDSA nonce as $k = F_x(h)$, with $F_x$ HMAC_DRBG keyed by the signing key x. We isolate the assumption its security rests on, A*: at known public key $Q = xG$, the signing transcript under nonces $F_x()$ is indistinguishable from the transcript under uniform nonces. A* suffices, and it is neither PRF security of HMAC nor auxiliary-input PRF security (AI-PRF) of $F_x$. A function $F'(x, h) = P_{Ext(xG)}(h)$ is a PRF under standard assumptions yet leaks x from one signature; the same holds for unmodified RFC 6979 over a compression function that keeps the PRF and dual-PRF properties used in proofs of HMAC, given a collision-resistance premise. A* and AI-PRF are separated in both directions. A* does not imply AI-PRF if the one-bit hidden number problem is hard. Conversely, in the standard model: any AI-PRF can be modified so that it stays one while two chosen-digest signing queries reveal x; under DDH with one public random point, or decisional square Diffie-Hellman without it, there is an AI-PRF whose key is recovered from signatures on two ordinary hashed messages; and a third function, under PRF security and DLP,…

  • Measurement study finds post-quantum TLS support is incomplete across email submission, relay, and access paths, leaving harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)post-quantumemailtls
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    arXiv:2610.36145v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) attacks make the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) urgent for email. This paper presents a systematic measurement that jointly examines PQC deployment across email service stages, negotiation by communicating peers, and usable message encryption. Endpoint-level support alone does not establish PQC readiness across email workflows because submission, relay, and access use independently negotiated Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections. We therefore combine three snapshots of relay, submission, access, and webmail services associated with the Tranco Top~1M domains with controlled tests of mail clients, sending servers, and OpenPGP and S/MIME implementations. Our measurements reveal a transition concentrated among a few providers, with available capability not consistently translating into actual use. Fewer than half of the domains in each service panel support PQC, and Google alone accounts for approximately 87\% of hybrid-capable relay domains. Only two of eight tested sending providers negotiate PQC with our receiver, although five accept it inbound. When TLS groups are restricted …

  • AttentionSwitch is a jailbreak defense for LLMs that jointly learns sparse attention-head selection and scaling to suppress unsafe behavior without full fine-tuning.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)jailbreakllmdefensearxiv
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    arXiv:2611.08752v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks, yet they remain susceptible to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or unintended outputs. Although safety can be improved through model fine-tuning, such approaches can be computationally expensive and may degrade previously acquired capabilities through catastrophic forgetting. Recent jailbreak defenses have therefore explored targeted interventions on specific model components associated with unsafe behavior. However, existing approaches typically decouple two inherently related decisions: where to intervene and how to modify the selected components. Such sequential optimization may be suboptimal because the optimal intervention location can depend on the intervention applied there, and vice versa. In this work, we introduce AttentionSwitch, the first jailbreak defense to jointly optimize intervention sites and strengths within a frozen LLM. Specifically, AttentionSwitch learns a sparse set of attention heads together with query-conditioned multiplicative scaling factors, allowing the outputs of the s…

  • A Hacker News user warns that the site's public emails are being scraped for phishing, citing fake AWS payment emails.

    Hacker News (front page)phishingscrapingscam
    Feed excerpt

    I know that many folks here post their personal emails in the Who's for Hire monthly pages and other places, and want to remind you that this public site gets views from folks with ill intent (or their bots/agents) as well. I use unique emails for every site, so I immediately knew that the late AWS payments email sent to my HN email were fake. There were other tells, but I want to remind everyone to be vigilant! HN is public but even social media sites where you supposedly can make your page private I've had some of those emails suddenly have spam sent to as well. Please be safe everyone! My favorite tells that an email is a scam: - Before opening a surprising/suspicious email, hover over the sender name to see the domain the sender came from (don't open the email if it's strange). - _If_ you already opened the email, before clicking any links in the email, hover over them to see the domain that the link sends you to. There are dozens more tips but a full article would be required, and these two will prevent you from falling for nearly all of them. Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50513451 Points: 58 # Comments: 10

  • Paper uses evolutionary transfer learning to craft physical adversarial attacks against end-to-end autoencoder communication systems.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)adversarialwirelessresearch
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    arXiv:2611.17393v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: End-to-end autoencoder communication has emerged as a promising means of achieving efficient data transmission across various domains. Nevertheless, vulnerabilities have recently been revealed in these systems by adversarial attacks, wherein malevolent entities manipulate the transmitted signals to deceive the autoencoder. This paper leverages the applications of evolutionary algorithms to solve a challenging optimization problem of launching physical attacks against end-to-end autoencoder communication. For white-box scenarios, we introduce PAGA (Physical Attack based on Genetic Algorithm), which combines a genetic algorithm with elite population initialization to craft attack signals that degrade autoencoder performance. To gauge the efficacy of these attack signals, we employ a fitness function that assesses their capacity to induce substantial reconstruction errors and misclassification rates. A Multi-Factorial version of PAGA, referred to as PAMFGA, is proposed to deal with practical scenarios where the attackers have limited knowledge about the receiver, also known as a black-box attack. Our experimental results show that the pr…

  • Paper proposes a checklist-based RL reward for training LLM agents on DDoS alert triage in a multi-agent workflow.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)llm-agentsddossoc
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    arXiv:2611.17534v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used for investigative tasks over incomplete evidence, such as cybersecurity alert triage, but reinforcement learning (RL) for such tasks is difficult: intermediate steps have no verifiable labels, rollouts are costly, and outcome rewards are sparse. We propose Insight Importance Checklist (I2C)-GRPO, a checklist reward for intermediate investigation steps. For each decision point, a panel of expert LLMs proposes investigative actions, their atomic forensic insights are extracted, and a separate three-model ranker panel orders the insights by importance. A reward model checks which ranked insights a candidate action targets and returns their consensus-weighted coverage. Because actions are scored without being executed, the reward is a proxy for expected investigative value, and training reduces to a one-step contextual bandit over fixed investigation prefixes. From a soft-computing perspective, the reward is an additive fuzzy measure whose rank-exponent weights act as an ordered weighted averaging (OWA)-type operator; one exponent sets its orness, i.e., how strongly the reward concen…

  • Study shows binarization in weightless neural networks like WiSARD can be exploited for adversarial attacks despite apparent robustness.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)adversarial-mlintrusion-detectionneural-networks
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    arXiv:2611.17646v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Weightless Neural Networks (WNNs) are lightweight classifiers that binarize their inputs and learn by storing binary patterns in lookup memories, which makes them attractive for resource-constrained tasks such as intrusion detection. Because a small perturbation that crosses no binarization threshold leaves the binary input unchanged, WNNs may appear naturally robust to adversarial examples; a perturbation that does cross a threshold, however, can still change the prediction. We study this tension in WiSARD, the canonical RAM-based WNN, and in two variants that replace its memories with Bloom filters, Bloom WiSARD and BTHOWeN. A continuous perturbation reaches these classifiers only by crossing an encoding threshold, changing at least one binary tuple, and redirecting a memory query; we formalize this mechanism with a threshold-crossing bound and a response-margin certificate for standard Boolean WiSARD. Controlled MNIST experiments compare linear and data-driven thermometer encodings under model-agnostic sensitivity probes, a score-based Simulated Annealing attack, and surrogate-transfer attacks. Changing only the encoding while keep…

  • Evaluates the fingerprint-copy attack against PRNU camera attribution and releases an open toolkit with triangle-test detection.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)forensicsprnuattack
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    arXiv:2611.17747v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) is the de facto standard trace for sensor-level source-camera attribution, and a high Peak-to-Correlation-Energy (PCE) between a questioned image and a camera reference fingerprint is routinely treated as strong evidence of common origin. The fingerprint-copy attack of Goljan, Fridrich and Chen (2011) shows that this signal can be forged: an adversary who estimates a target camera's fingerprint from that camera's publicly available images can inject a scaled copy of it into an unrelated photograph, producing a forgery that clears a PCE decision threshold despite never having been taken by the target device. We present prnucf, an open, auditable toolkit that pairs a reference implementation of the (additive) fingerprint-copy attack with the triangle-test detector and a cohort-calibrated decision procedure, so that practitioners can quantify how fragile a PRNU attribution is against this attack on their own pipelines. On a controlled multi-camera Monte-Carlo benchmark the attack reaches an arbitrary target PCE at a mean PSNR of 59.2 dB (visually lossless), yet the triangle test separates forgeries fr…

  • Shows multi-mode cyber-physical systems leak sensitive events through mode-change scheduling timing side channels.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)side-channeltimingcps
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    arXiv:2611.17761v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Many cyber-physical systems (CPS) are multi-mode: they switch between operating modes with different tasksets and timing parameters in response to physical events or user activity. We show that these mode changes create a timing side channel: by altering the interference experienced by co-running tasks, they let an unprivileged co-resident observer infer sensitive events, such as a homeowner's arrival or a vehicle's route, from its own execution timing and, on multicore platforms, its core assignment. Existing schedule-based attacks and defenses miss this channel because they assume single-mode systems or target a specific, known victim task. We present STAMP, a lightweight attack that needs no knowledge of task parameters or scheduling policy, and works whether or not the system exposes its modes. On a ZoneMinder home-security deployment, STAMP identifies the modes with 94.7% accuracy on unseen hardware, using under 0.5% of one core. On ROS 2 AMCL with the Oxford RobotCar dataset, it identifies which of seven route segments a vehicle traversed with 86.0% accuracy on unseen platforms. A schedule-randomization defense lowers detection …

  • Presents response manipulation attacks on multi-agent systems and proposes design-level defenses against malicious agent responses.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)multi-agentllmattack
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    arXiv:2611.17883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent systems solve complex tasks by decomposing them into subtasks, delegating the subtasks to agents, and aggregating the agents' responses using an aggregation rule. Malicious agents can manipulate the final solution by providing malicious responses to their assigned subtasks. In this paper, we first propose response manipulation attacks (ReMA), which iteratively optimize malicious responses to maximize attack effectiveness. Specifically, we formulate untargeted and targeted attacks as optimization problems and develop an approach to approximately solve these problems by iteratively refining malicious responses based on feedback from a surrogate multi-agent system. To defend against such attacks, we further propose SecMAS, a secure aggregation rule that leverages the semantic similarities among agent responses to select the response that is most consistent with a sufficiently large subset of the other responses. We theoretically establish security guarantees for SecMAS against both untargeted and targeted attacks. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that existing aggregation rules are vulnerable to ReMA, whereas SecMAS effectiv…

  • Describes acquiring per-layer activations from a live GPU LLM process with a non-modifying debugger for request-level forensic attribution.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)forensicsgpullm
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    arXiv:2611.18272v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing memory forensics for machine learning systems typically targets static artifacts, such as model weights or prompt logs, rather than the transient computational states of a live inference process. This gap limits an examiner's ability to analyze the specific behavior of a running large language model (LLM) service that cannot be restarted or modified. We present a method for acquiring per-layer residual-stream activations from a live GPU process using a non-modifying debugger, without requiring prior knowledge of the model's architecture parameters or weights. The approach employs a general six-stage process with platform-specific adapters, utilizing either a PyTorch allocator clock or a kernel-launch clock to identify and read tensor allocations from video memory. We validate this acquisition on 33 open-source decoder-only models across nine architecture classes, demonstrating that the recovered bytes are byte-exact and usable for downstream analysis. As a use case, we apply linear probes trained on standard framework activations to the recovered states, successfully distinguishing refusal from compliance with an AUROC of 0.8…

  • Shows smartphone magnetometers can capture electric train magnetic fields, enabling passenger location and route inference without permissions.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)privacysensorsmobile
    Feed excerpt

    arXiv:2611.18312v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Inertial sensors of smartphones are a well-known privacy risk, as they allow inferring sensitive user movements and activity without explicit permissions. Among these sensors, the magnetometer has received little attention, as it is assumed to measure mainly the Earth's magnetic field. In this paper, we show that electric trains generate distinctive magnetic fields that can be captured by a smartphone magnetometer. Apps deployed on the device can access these signals without user permission, enabling two novel attacks on passenger privacy: First, we are able to determine whether the user is riding an electric train (transport mode detection). Second, we can infer whether other victims are aboard the same train due to shared patterns in the magnetic field (colocation prediction). In an empirical evaluation across 217 train rides, we demonstrate that both attacks are effective, confirming a real-world threat. We discuss countermeasures and argue that magnetometer access should require explicit user permission in mobile operating systems.

  • Proposes Byzantine-tolerant distributed EV charging coordination combining threshold cryptography and machine learning against malicious participants.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)ev-chargingthreshold-cryptoresearch
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    arXiv:2611.17577v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Distributed coordination of electric vehicle (EV) charging with the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) keeps EV constraints private but assumes that every participant follows the algorithm. This assumption fails in practice, where a biased operator or a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacker can send inconsistent signals to different EVs, and compromised EVs can deviate from their prescribed updates. We first prove that attacks by such arbitrarily malicious, i.e., Byzantine, participants do not prevent convergence and therefore remain undetected, and derive the most damaging attack in closed form. We then propose a framework that combines a threshold-signed broadcast with upload recomputation, which detects every deviation without false alarms at linear instead of quadratic communication cost. To keep the optimization running, each affected EV recovers locally with a certified, fleet-aware machine learning price forecast, and we prove that the optimization remains convergent with a recovery cost bounded by the shape of the forecast error. Simulation results with real-world load, price, and charging data show that a biased…

  • Applies a Markovian data fusion approach combining AIS vessel tracking with space-based RF observations for maritime monitoring.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)maritimeaisrf
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    arXiv:2611.18563v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Monitoring maritime activities is important for safety and security, particularly for detecting illegal activities, but remains challenging due to the size and complexity of the maritime domain. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is commonly used for this purpose, despite its known vulnerabilities. In contrast, space-based radio frequency (RF) observations provide an independent source of vessel activity but lack ship identification and therefore cannot identify vessels on their own. Following the CRISP-DM process, this study applies a Pair Hidden Markov Model (PHMM) to align individual RF detections with AIS trajectories, using temporal and spatial information while modeling noise and timing discrepancies. We evaluate it on NOAA AIS data with synthetic RF detections against nearest-neighbor baselines and analyze its errors with bias tests on trajectory length, sampling density, stationarity and AIS--RF distance. The length-corrected Forward score reaches a top-1 precision of $0.7776$ on the validation split of multi-candidate detections, where errors are possible, and an AUC of $0.637$ for detecting dark vessels among the de…

  • Proposes FROST2 threshold Schnorr signature modifications that improve security from TS-SUF-2 to TS-SUF-4 under the one-more discrete log assumption.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)threshold-signaturescryptography
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    arXiv:2610.02805v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Threshold signature schemes play a vital role in securing digital assets within blockchain and distributed systems. FROST2 stands out as a practical threshold Schnorr signature scheme, noted for its efficiency and compatibility with standard verification processes. However, under the one-more discrete logarithm assumption, with static corruption and centralized key generation settings, FROST2 has been shown by Bellare et al. (in CRYPTO 2022) to achieve only TS-SUF-2 security, which is a consequence of its vulnerability to TS-UF-3 attacks. In this paper, we address this security limitation by presenting an enhanced variant of FROST2, namely, FROST2+ which achieves the TS-SUF-4 security level under the same computational assumptions as the original FROST2. FROST2+ strengthens FROST2 by integrating additional pre-processing token verifications that help mitigate TS-UF-3 and TS-UF-4 vulnerabilities while maintaining practical efficiency. We show that FROST2+ can achieve TS-SUF-4 security not only under the same conditions as the original FROST2 analysis, but also when initialized with a distributed key generation protocol such as PedP…

  • Researchers show subtle input perturbations to deep learning weather models can steer downstream tropical cyclone trajectory predictions toward attacker-chosen paths.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)adversarial-mlforecastingarxiv
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    arXiv:2510.10140v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deep learning-based weather forecasting (DLWF) models leverage past weather observations to generate future forecasts, supporting a wide range of downstream applications, including tropical cyclone (TC) prediction. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of these models to adversarial attacks, where subtle perturbations to upstream forecasts can alter downstream TC trajectory predictions. Crafting perturbed inputs to steer downstream outputs toward attacker-specified trajectories is a challenging problem for several reasons. First, conventional TC detection systems are opaque, non-differentiable black boxes, making standard gradient-based attacks infeasible. Second, the extreme rarity of TC events leads to a severe class imbalance problem, making it difficult to develop attack methods that produce realistic-looking cyclone paths aligned with target trajectories. To overcome these limitations, we propose Cyc-Attack, a novel method for perturbing the forecasts of DLWF models to generate adversarial trajectories. The proposed method uses a differentiable surrogate model to approximate the TC detector's output, enabling …

  • A systematisation of knowledge paper assesses how post-quantum cryptography is integrated and adopted across the software development lifecycle against NIST guidance.

    arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)post-quantumcryptographyarxiv
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    arXiv:2611.08442v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Standardised post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is critical for protecting software systems against future quantum threats, but standardised algorithms alone do not provide a pathway for their secure integration into software. This paper presents a Systematisation of Knowledge (SoK) of PQC integration in software development, synthesising existing approaches across implementation, migration, and developer education. We analyse these approaches against NIST PQC standards and PQC migration guidance, software development lifecycle coverage, cybersecurity practices, deployment maturity, and testing and evaluation evidence. Our analysis shows that existing work establishes important technical and organisational foundations but provides disconnected support across the software development lifecycle, with limited coordination between preparation, implementation, migration, deployment, maintenance, and developer practices. Evaluation evidence also remains concentrated in controlled or early-stage settings, providing stronger evidence of technical feasibility than operational readiness. We identify cross-cutting gaps and research direct…

  • The SANS Internet Storm Center published its Stormcast daily security podcast episode for November 16, 2026.

    SANS Internet Storm Centersanspodcastthreat-monitoring
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    (c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

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