AI
8 items · 27 articles in this topic
Economics and operations lead the day: API price cuts of up to 80%, an IBM CEO endorsing on-prem open-weight models, and a skeptical Apollo economist. Research items probe unlearning leaks and LLM auditors' misplaced trust in static analysis.
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Minimaxir analyzes why OpenAI and Anthropic cut LLM API prices by up to 80% within months. Aiven separately proposes an open source LLM gateway to manage token costs.
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IBM's CEO says open-weight models are now good and cheap enough for on-premises enterprise deployment.
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The Aiven proposal extends its database-service model to an open source LLM gateway aimed at token bills.
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A study finds a 10-year-old convolutional neural network outperforms frontier LLMs at skin cancer diagnosis.
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TRACE shows approximate unlearning in LLMs leaves recoverable traces in model snapshots, enabling text reconstruction of supposedly removed data.
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One paper shows individually benign third-party agent skills can compose into safety-violating chains, and proposes capability-flow graph analysis to detect them. Another finds LLM vulnerability auditors over-trust static-analysis evidence, including fabricated assurances, on PrimeVul C/C++ functions.
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Drew Breunig surveys current context engineering practice for LLM applications. A separate post explains Microsoft's Decision-1, a 9B model built on Qwen weights.
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r/opensource moderators banned AI-related projects and non-English speakers in new rules. Backlash followed, along with a rival subreddit.
More in AI · 20 articles›
DeepAVR uses multi-agent LLM collaboration to repair vulnerabilities whose root causes are hidden far from the sanitizer crash site.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)llmvulnerability-repairagentsFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.32345v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Automated Vulnerability Repair (AVR) has emerged as a critical defense against software security flaws, aiming to triage and fix bugs autonomously. Early LLM-based approaches focused on patch generation under the assumption of perfect fault localization, while recent end-to-end methods attempt to repair vulnerabilities directly from sanitizer logs. However, these methods often fail when the root cause is deeply hidden--either physically distant from the crash site or logically masked by interdependent errors--making the initial report insufficient. We propose DeepAVR, a multi-agent framework for end-to-end AVR that performs deep analysis by transforming intermediate repair outcomes into structured diagnostic feedback. DeepAVR decomposes repair into specialized roles--Fault Localization, Patch Generation, Compile Validation, Security Validation, Functionality Validation, and Patch Review--and routes feedback across these roles to iteratively refine both localization and patch hypotheses. In particular, DeepAVR introduces patch-conditioned re-localization, which treats execution results from intermediate patches as diagnostic signals …
Study finds LLM vulnerability auditors over-trust static-analysis evidence, including fabricated assurances, when auditing PrimeVul C/C++ functions.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)llmstatic-analysisvulnerability-auditFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.32876v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Pipelines that combine large language models (LLMs) with static analysis let the model consume the analyser's output as evidence, but whether the model distinguishes true from false evidence, and whether its scrutiny depends on what the evidence claims, has not been measured. We built an intraprocedural analyser for C/C++ that produces proof obligations and audited vulnerable and patched functions from PrimeVul under six evidence conditions that differ only in the notes, including fabricated assurances that a missing check exists and fabricated alarms that an added check is missing. The study covers 916 pairs in four disjoint sets, eleven model configurations from four vendors and 16,572 audits; no model is trained or fine-tuned. True evidence barely improved accuracy (+0.02). False evidence acted asymmetrically: relative to true notes about the same operations, false assurances lowered the detection of real vulnerabilities by up to 19 points, whereas false alarms never significantly lowered accuracy and were disputed far more often. An internally registered replication on seven new models confirmed that false assurances move verdic…
SynMark proposes a multi-bit watermarking method for LLM-generated code that stays robust to identifier renaming and refactoring.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)llmwatermarkingcodeFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.32017v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-generated code is increasingly reused across downstream applications and often undergoes identifier renaming or structural refactoring, making robustness to functionality-preserving edits essential for generative multi-bit code watermarking. Existing methods commonly derive message routes from surface-token prefixes, so such edits can desynchronize routing and degrade watermark recovery. We propose SynMark, which replaces surface-dependent routing with learned semantic coordinates and further calibrates residual recovery errors after transformation. For watermark embedding, Scope learns semantic coordinates from aligned prefixes of functionally equivalent variants for keyed routing and applies a syntax-aware adaptive bias during generation. For watermark extraction, Traced recomputes semantic routes from transformed code and uses reliability-weighted aggregation to suppress unreliable token contributions. Under 100% identifier renaming, SynMark retains 82.27% and 83.77% BitAcc on CodeLlama and DeepSeek-Coder, respectively. Across three code LMs, it also improves clean BitAcc and Pass@1 by up to 4.53 and 11.18 percentage points ove…
The paper studies how an honest-but-curious server can infer sensitive attributes from features sent by edge-cloud split multimodal LLMs.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)llmprivacyattribute-inferenceFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.32079v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Edge-cloud split inference runs the early layers of a multimodal large language model (MLLM) on a device and sends intermediate features to a server to complete the task. While keeping raw images local is often perceived as a privacy benefit, an honest-but-curious server can still infer sensitive attributes, such as age, gender, and race, from the received features. Existing protections intervene at the input, transmitted representation, or model's responses, but their native evaluations rely on final-response refusals or fixed-classifier failures, which underestimate an adaptive server's capabilities. To address this, we propose a label-budgeted attribute-inference framework that measures representation-level privacy through a recovery curve: the share of the unprotected leakage the server recovers as a function of its labeled-sample budget, from zero (a classifier trained on unprotected features) to a full labeled set. Our evaluation across two popular MLLMs reveals two critical findings. First, in unprotected pipelines, intermediate features leak all three attributes regardless of the split depth. Second, even when protection mecha…
AgentTrace fingerprints the foundation model behind black-box LLM agents by analyzing observable tool-call execution traces.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)llmagentsfingerprintingFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.32092v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Verifying the provenance of autonomous LLM agents is a critical security challenge. Existing semantic attribution is easily obfuscated by system prompts, while active watermarking conflicts with schema-constrained tool generation. We propose AgentTrace, an active framework that identifies the foundation model behind a black-box agent via observable execution traces. AgentTrace injects structurally ambiguous probes to trigger tokenization-sensitive serialization failures at rigid tool interfaces. While these initial failures provide coarse-grained separation across model families, the temporal sequence of subsequent repair operations reveals fine-grained, model-specific recovery behaviors. By modeling these multi-step trajectories with lightweight Markov chains, AgentTrace achieves 96.0% attribution accuracy under adversarial identity spoofing. Crucially, sequential repair modeling successfully distinguishes the evaluated intra-family variants sharing identical tokenizers (e.g., Llama-3 8B/70B), substantially outperforming unordered behavioral statistics while remaining robust against prompt obfuscation and temperature scaling.
Concept Acupuncturist uses sparse autoencoders to erase target concepts from diffusion image models with more precise edits than prior unlearning methods.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)diffusionunlearningsparse-autoencoderFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.32059v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Diffusion-based image generation models produce high-quality images but may generate harmful or policy-violating content, motivating machine unlearning (MU) to selectively remove target concepts while preserving general capabilities. However, existing MU approaches often struggle with the distributed and entangled nature of concept representations, leading to inefficient optimization and imprecise edits when applied through large-scale fine-tuning over full diffusion trajectories. To bridge this gap, we propose Concept Acupuncturist (ConceptACP), a novel MU framework that integrates interpretability-guided analysis with inference-free fine-tuning for efficient and precise concept removal. By establishing mappings between semantic concepts and cross-attention blocks in the U-Net denoiser and localizing the most concept-relevant block for targeted optimization, ConceptACP avoids full diffusion trajectory optimization, thereby improving fine-tuning efficiency. To mitigate concept entanglement, we propose a feature-level correction mechanism based on Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), where SAE-derived sparse, semantically meaningful feature a…
CA-DPSGD proposes curvature-aware gradient clipping using approximate second-order information to reduce bias in differentially private training.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)dp-sgdprivacyoptimizationFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.32175v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DPSGD) has become the de facto standard for training deep neural networks with rigorous privacy guarantees. However, the utility of DPSGD is constrained by gradient clipping bias and DP noise. While existing work has tried to address these issues, the geometric misalignment caused by clipping bias remains a critical challenge. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel framework, Curvature-Aware Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (CA-DPSGD), which leverages approximate second-order information to construct an optimal, curvature-aware clipping space. CA-DPSGD integrates a rectified estimator for the curvature matrix and is coupled with an anisotropic noise mechanism to ensure privacy guarantees. Extensive empirical experiments demonstrate that our approach outperforms state-of-the-art clipping methods.
Paper localizes safety-related representations across layers of Qwen3-VL-4B and shows steering early vision layers controls refusal behavior.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)vlmsafetyinterpretabilityFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.32182v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are widely deployed, yet the internal mechanisms behind their safety behavior remain poorly understood. We present a lightweight inference-time framework for localizing and manipulating safety-sensitive representations in frozen VLMs, without retraining or modifying parameters. On Qwen3-VL-4B, layer-wise activation divergence analysis reveals non-uniform safety geometry across depth. Causal interventions show that early vision layers support strong bidirectional refusal control through activation steering along a learned safety direction, with unsafe rejection spanning 6%-96%, whereas later layers respond more to activation magnitude scaling and exhibit a substantial safety-selectivity trade-off. Deeper layers remain well separated along the safety direction yet are largely insensitive to steering, distinguishing representational separability from causal controllability. InternVL2.5-4B shows qualitatively similar depth-dependent activation geometry despite differences in layer location and magnitude. Our results expose a white-box, representation-level refusal-bypass attack surface in VLM vision encoder…
STROKE is a black-box adversarial attack that uses sparse oriented rectangular occlusions to fool image classifiers with few queries.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)adversarialblack-boxcomputer-visionFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.32932v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce STROKE, a query-efficient score-based black-box adversarial attack that constructs perturbations from simple oriented rectangular occlusions. STROKE optimizes these perturbations through a lightweight greedy add-and-refine procedure. Across diverse image classifiers, STROKE achieves high attack success with low query counts at nominal 1--2\% area settings, showing favorable performance relative to existing patch-based attacks in several configurations. Matched comparisons further demonstrate substantial reductions in wall-clock attack time, while ablation studies examine the key design choices and effectiveness across structural primitives. These findings suggest that simple structural occlusions offer an effective and computationally efficient search space for black-box adversarial attacks.
TensorCommitments proposes a lightweight tensor-native scheme for verifying LLM inference correctness without rerunning the model.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)llmverifiable-inferencecryptographyFeed excerpt
arXiv:2602.12630v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Most large language models (LLMs) run on external clouds: users send a prompt, pay for inference, and must trust that the remote GPU executes the LLM without any adversarial tampering. We critically ask how to achieve verifiable LLM inference, where a prover (the service) must convince a verifier (the client) that an inference was run correctly without rerunning the LLM. Existing cryptographic works are too slow at the LLM scale, while non-cryptographic ones require a strong verifier GPU. We propose TensorCommitments (TCs), a tensor-native proof-of-inference scheme. TC binds the LLM inference to a commitment, an irreversible tag that breaks under tampering, organized in our multivariate Terkle Trees. For LLaMA2, TC adds only 0.97% prover and 0.12% verifier time over inference while improving robustness to tailored attacks by up to 48\% over the best prior work requiring a verifier GPU.
Argues that AI output watermarks should be evaluated as monitoring tools, since they can link outputs to their generating entity.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)watermarkingllmprivacyFeed excerpt
arXiv:2605.13095v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Watermarking is a primary means for providers of generative models to meet legal requirements to mark synthetic content. A watermark embeds a hidden signal into generated content that a detector holding a secret key can later recover. Its security is evaluated primarily against adversaries who remove or forge this signal in individual outputs. We argue that watermarking should also be evaluated and governed as a \emph{monitoring primitive}, because the same signal can link outputs to the entity that generated them. We show that (i) internal observers with detector access attribute outputs to individual entities even under zero-bit watermarks, which encode no identity, when each entity holds its own key, and (ii) external observers without keys or detectors identify the source of unseen text and image outputs in the configurations we test. Both depend on deployment choices that evaluations do not report, namely how fine-grained and persistent the bindings between keys and entities are and who may query the detector. We call for evaluations to report attribution and identification accuracy alongside robustness, and for governance to…
Proposes constitution-guided watermarking that adapts watermark strength per request to balance robustness and text quality.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)watermarkingllmeu-ai-actFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.09552v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Regulation such as the EU AI Act requires providers of language models to mark generated text in a machine-readable way. Watermarking meets this requirement by embedding a secret-key signal during generation, so the provider can later detect its model's text. A watermark should stay detectable, preserve quality and survive paraphrasing, but a stronger signal survives more paraphrasing and distorts more text. Providers resolve this trade-off with one configuration for all requests, although a provider may want robustness for misuse-prone requests and no watermark for editing assistance, which the EU AI Act exempts. We introduce \emph{constitution-guided watermarking}, in which the provider states these requirements as natural-language rules, a \emph{watermark constitution}, and each request receives its rule's configuration. Offline, a reasoning agent reads the rules and the watermark code and refines each rule's configuration from measured detection, quality and robustness. At deployment, a monitor routes each prompt to its rule's configuration without modifying the serving model. Each configuration is stored with its evidence, so…
Studies whether safety holds across recurrent depths in Looped Language Models, finding robustness under jailbreaks is unclear.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)llmjailbreaksafetyFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.10625v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Looped Language Models (LoopLMs) provide a parameter efficient approach to scaling model capabilities through repeated use of shared parameters across recurrent steps. Since each recurrent depth can be read out independently, a single LoopLM exposes a broader output space across inference depths, raising an important question: whether safety is preserved throughout recurrent computation. Prior evaluations suggest that deeper recurrence can improve safety on harmful queries, but robustness under jailbreak attacks remains unclear. We therefore conduct a comprehensive safety evaluation of LoopLMs under jailbreak attacks targeting different recurrent depths. We find that attack success can increase at deeper inference depths, the same query can elicit different safety behaviors across depths, and attacks constructed against one depth can transfer to others. Moreover, SFT and preference alignment do not eliminate these safety gaps, motivating an alignment method designed for LoopLMs. We introduce SafeBridge, which combines lightweight depth specific control of shared recurrent layers, selective state bridging, and joint safety supervis…
StealthRL: Reinforcement Learning Paraphrase Attacks for Multi-Detector Evasion of AI-Text Detectors2
StealthRL uses reinforcement learning to generate paraphrases that sharply evade multiple AI-text detectors while preserving meaning.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)ai-text-detectionadversarialllmFeed excerpt
arXiv:2602.08934v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI-text detectors are increasingly used in high-stakes settings, but their robustness to meaning-preserving adversarial rewriting remains unclear. We introduce StealthRL, a reinforcement learning framework for stress-testing detectors with adaptive paraphrase attacks. StealthRL trains a paraphrase policy against a detector ensemble while enforcing semantic fidelity, then evaluates transfer to held-out detector families on the full filtered MAGE test pool. Across RoBERTa, Fast-DetectGPT, Binoculars, and MAGE, the resulting attack sharply degrades detection performance, driving mean TPR@1%FPR down to 0.024 while retaining nontrivial semantic overlap and readable prose. The attack also transfers to detectors not used during training, indicating a broader robustness failure rather than overfitting to a single target model. We complement the main results with detector-score analysis, repeated-generation stability checks, and automatic and judge-based quality evaluation. Our findings suggest that current AI-text detectors remain brittle under adaptive paraphrasing pressure and motivate robustness evaluation at deployment-relevant …
Janus trains agent safety guards to anticipate delayed operational risks from partial tool-using agent trajectories.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)agent-safetyguardrailsllmFeed excerpt
arXiv:2607.19913v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agent safety is moving from content moderation toward preventing operational failures before tool-using agents act. We propose Janus, a foresight-oriented framework for long-horizon agent safety that trains guards to anticipate delayed risks from partial trajectories. Janus synthesizes diverse agent trajectories via multi-agent simulation and learns a shared policy with two coupled tasks: an anticipation task that forecasts safety-relevant futures and an adjudication task that decides safety from both the observed prefix and anticipated future. The two tasks are jointly optimized with CoAA-RL, which rewards forecasts by their utility for downstream safety judgment. The resulting guard model, Vanguard, blocks unsafe actions before execution. Across four agent-safety benchmarks, Vanguard improves average protection by 15.9 percentage points over baseline guards while increasing benign task completion by 5.1 percentage points.
Paper analyzes privacy loss incurred during diffusion model sampling, using empirical denoiser sensitivity bounds rather than training-time DP.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)differential-privacydiffusion-modelsarxivFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.27710v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Diffusion models have emerged as the foundation of modern generative systems, yet their high memorization capacity raises privacy concerns. While differentially private (DP) training provides formal guarantees, it comes at a cost in sample quality. In this work, we study a complementary question: how much privacy loss is incurred during the sampling process itself? Directly analyzing modern neural denoisers is challenging because their sensitivity to a single training example is generally intractable. To overcome this challenge, we construct and analyze a clipped privacy-accountable empirical denoiser, a training-free estimator of the Bayes-optimal denoiser, whose per-step sensitivity can be computed explicitly, allowing each denoising step to be a Gaussian mechanism. This perspective enables privacy accounting under Gaussian DP when each training example contributes to each denoising step, and under $f$-DP trade-off functions when each generated sample uses a single randomly subsampled block of the training data. We report every $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ guarantee as a certified upper bound from a privacy loss distribution ac…
Paper investigates whether safety probe performance on language model activations can be predicted in advance by scaling laws.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)llmsafetyprobesarxivFeed excerpt
arXiv:2610.30678v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety probes trained on a model's activations are a standard tool for monitoring language models in real time. Each time a new model is released or a new harm area needs to be monitored, the probe must be retrained, which requires new labels and a choice of probe architecture. Yet neither the model nor the labels tell us in advance how well the resulting probe will perform. Finding out requires training and comparing many probe configurations. In this paper, we ask whether probe performance can instead be predicted in advance from model size and the number of labels. Existing safety datasets are insufficient for this, as they are either limited in scale or already saturated. We therefore construct six new safety datasets of sufficient size and difficulty. On these datasets, we train two probe architectures on 20 base models from five model families, with 32 to $10^{6}$ labels for each model. We measure performance using probe error, defined as 1 - AUROC, where lower values are better. We find that probe error follows two simple scaling laws. First, the lowest probe error a model can reach falls as a power law in its size. S…
A blog post explains Microsoft's Decision-1 model, a 9B model built on Qwen weights.
Hacker News (front page)llmmicrosoftqwenFeed excerpt
Article URL: https://shattered.io/microsoft-decision-1-qwen3-5-9b-model-2026/ Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50238620 Points: 26 # Comments: 9
An arXiv paper from 2025 argues against attention as the core mechanism needed in neural sequence models.
Hacker News (front page)researchtransformersFeed excerpt
Article URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.19428 Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50237224 Points: 34 # Comments: 15
Grok released the first seven minutes of an AI-generated video titled Odyssey, which reviewers found passable but lacking artistry.
TechCrunchgrokxaigenerative-videoFeed excerpt
The footage looks okay, as long as you're not seeking artistry, inspiration, or human interest.