Friday, October 16, 2026

Published 7:01 AM · 120 articles from 14 sources · about 5 min to read in full

CS & research

The day's research came from cs.CR and covers hardware isolation, side channels, cryptographic deployment attacks and runtime supply-chain defence.

What happened

PAGE404 shows how hardware-assisted page migration on NVIDIA Grace Hopper GH200 can be abused to break GPU isolation. arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security) ↗
A reaction attack recovers a CKKS ternary secret key with asymptotically optimal query complexity, using client validity responses. arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security) ↗
A paper formalises hardware-software leakage contracts so programmers can reason about Spectre-style microarchitectural side channels. arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security) ↗
GhostLock demonstrates a blind physical-layer GPS signal nullification attack that suppresses satellite signals via destructive interference, without victim-side information. arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security) ↗
GoLeash proposes per-package least-privilege runtime policies to mitigate Go software supply-chain attacks. arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security) ↗

Articles the model saw · 3

Foundations of Hardware-Software Leakage Contracts3
An arXiv paper formalizes hardware-software leakage contracts to help programmers reason about Spectre-style microarchitectural side channels.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)10 h agospectreside-channelresearch
Feed excerpt
arXiv:2610.20754v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Microarchitectural attacks such as Spectre and Meltdown undermine security by exploiting software-visible side effects of microarchitectural optimizations like caches and speculative execution. To use modern hardware securely, programmers must take into account the security implications of these optimizations. Yet instruction set architectures (ISAs)---the conventional abstraction layer between hardware and software---are ill-suited for secure programming: by design, they abstract from microarchitectural details and therefore fail to reflect their security consequences. A new security abstraction is emerging to fill this void: hardware-software leakage contracts. To support the principled development of secure software on modern hardware such contracts characterize side-channel leakage at the ISA level. Thereby they enable programmers and compilers to generate code that is provably resistant to side-channel attacks---without having to explicitly reason about the microarchitecture. On the other hand, they provide a specification for hardware designers to ensure that microarchitectures do not introduce unintended and undocumented side c…
Reaction Attack on CKKS Deployments with Asymptotically Optimal Query Complexity3
Reaction attack recovers a CKKS ternary secret key with asymptotically optimal query complexity via client validity responses.
arXiv cs.CR (Cryptography & Security)10 h agohomomorphic-encryptioncryptanalysis
Feed excerpt
arXiv:2610.21127v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a protocol-level reaction leakage in CKKS deployments where public coefficient-to-slot (C2S) evaluation keys are combined with a client's 1-bit validity response. Under this deployment surface, a malicious evaluator can recover a ternary secret key using asymptotically optimal $O(H)$ reaction queries, where $H$ is the entropy of the secret key. The attack does not break RLWE or CKKS IND-CPA security. Instead, it exploits the interaction between client-side validity reactions and public homomorphic linear transformations. A shift of a public encryption key yields a ciphertext whose plaintext is a function of the secret key; the public ${\sf C2S}$ layer then repacks this information to construct a ciphertext whose validity depends strictly on whether a targeted secret coefficient matches a guessed value. Furthermore, each submitted query is independently randomized with a fresh encryption of zero, so that each resulting malicious ciphertext appears entirely distinct, thereby allowing the attack to simply evade trivial detection mechanisms on the client side. We implemented the full end-to-end attack in Lattigo v6.2.0 and recove…
Writing stateful effect handlers in EYG2
A Lobsters post describes writing stateful effect handlers in the EYG programming language.
Lobsters4 h agoprogramming-languageseffects
Feed excerpt
Comments